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Abstract: The governments of the European Union are facing important challenges that may 
impact both their need and their capacity to collect taxes. First, ageing will increase some 
social spending while reducing the potential of some tax bases such as labour. Second, 
globalisation has the potential to increase the mobility of capital and of high-skilled workers, 
making it more difficult to rely on them as a source of revenues. Finally, the desire to shift tax 
away from labour and to make work pay while retaining the social models will force Member 
States to find alternative robust tax bases. This paper reviews the most recent trends in 
taxation in the European Union and discusses several tax policy issues in the light of those 
coming challenges. 
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1. Introduction.  
Over the latest years, we have witnessed a certain stabilisation in the overall tax 
burden of EU Member States. This marked an interruption of many years of increasing tax 
burdens, reflecting increasing public expenditures. More recently, overall levels of 
expenditure are being reduced in an effort to consolidate public finances, followed to some 
extent by some reduction in revenues as percentage of GDP after the peak in the late 1990s. 
While pursuing more efficiency in public spending should help reduce the pressure on 
revenues, the future economic and budgetary impact of population ageing and globalisation 
present significant challenges which require a comprehensive strategy, including on the 
taxation side. 
EU Member States have carried out important reforms of their tax systems. These 
reforms were driven by several factors. First, high unemployment rates and low participation 
rates represent a loss of human capital and create social tensions. The growing awareness that 
the excessive tax burden on labour and its interaction with the benefit systems lower work 
incentives, especially for those with low earnings potential, has led EU Member States to 
move towards a more employment-friendly labour taxation. In doing this, they have also 
faced the difficulty of finding alternative tax bases to finance their expenditures. Second, 
Member States have undertaken efforts to rationalise and simplify their tax systems. Almost 
all efforts have gone in the direction of broadening the tax base in order to reduce the tax 
rates. This potentially brings economic benefits but also bring forward the question of a 
possible trade-off between efficiency and fairness. Finally, globalisation and ageing have 
raised the issue of the financing of the social models in the European countries. In particular, 
the constraints imposed by these challenges have focussed the debate around the need for 
finding alternative and robust tax bases. This paper discusses the implications of these 
challenges for tax policy in the European Union and reviews the options for financing the 
welfare state. 
Tax collection has been impacted by structural developments and growing challenges. 
Economic integration and the increasing mobility of factors of production, in particular 
capital, have made it easier for tax bases to relocate and taxes are one element determining 
this choice. In the face of the growing challenges of ageing and globalisation, Member States 
have been progressively more concerned by the perspective of vanishing tax bases or the 
progressive shift of the tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases which could ultimately 
threaten their capacity to finance their social model(s). Taxes are indeed closely linked to the 
objectives of the welfare state. These objectives can be conveniently classified according to 
the following categories: efficiency of the economy, supporting the living standards at all 
stage of life or in case of adverse events, reducing inequalities, promoting social integration, 
protecting citizens, and ensuring an intelligible and abuse-free administration (Barr, 2002)1. 
To meet these aims, taxation can be used in different ways2. First, taxation can be used as a 
source of financing for public interventions such as the production of public goods, the 
transfer of income or the provision of insurance with compulsory membership. Second, 
taxation can also be used to directly correct market failures or to promote (resp. discourage) 
the consumption of merit goods (resp. demerit goods) for which positive (resp. negative) 
externalities are not internalised. 
                                                 
1  An alternative classification deals with the three 'R's' of the welfare state: Redistribution between people, Risk 
and insurance, and Reallocation over the life cycle (de Mooij, 2006). 
2  Note that besides taxation, regulation, public production, income transfers and subsidies are other alternative 
or complementary instruments in the hands of governments. 
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It naturally follows that the level – and to some extent the structure – of taxation is 
closely linked to the level of public expenditures. Several factors are shaping the degree of 
government intervention in the economy (Tanzi, 1997). First, the level of economic 
development is impacting the efficiency of markets and hence the need for policy 
intervention. In more developed economies, for which basic needs are fulfilled, citizens may 
express a higher desire for larger social programmes, a phenomenon known as the Wagner 
Law or Law of Increasing State Spending. Next, the level of technological development may 
shape government spending in several directions. Technological improvements may break 
natural monopolies and hence create less scope for direct public intervention. Innovation can 
also reduce the cost of existing technologies but in the same time bring new ones that are 
more costly – a well-known phenomenon in health care expenditures. Third, the degree of 
openness of the economy may increase the need for a larger public sector that acts as a buffer 
against external shocks (Rodrik, 1998). Finally and foremost, social attitudes, mainstream 
economic or political thinking, and historical developments help understanding the evolution 
of the size of the government3. As evidenced by table (1), during the period between the 1870 
French-German war and WWI, total public expenditures to GDP were at a meagre 10-15%. 
Following the post-WWII Keynesian revolution and the oil shock of the early 1970s, public 
expenditures soared to reach levels above 50% of GDP in most countries. Over the last 
decade, public expenditures have somewhat retreated in Europe. The analysis contained in 
this paper shall therefore be read in the light of historical perspectives and current social 
preferences towards the extent and functions of the welfare state. It shall also recognise the 
strong link between taxation and the level of public expenditures, especially because of the 
need to ensure fiscal discipline.  
 
Table (1): Total public expenditures as a percentage of GDP – selected countries 
 1880 1913 1920 1937 1960 1968 1974 1987 1995 2004 
Austria n.a. n.a. 14.7c 14.8 35.7 40.6 41.9 52.4 53.2 50.6 
Belgium n.a. 13.8 c 22.1 c 21.8 c 34.5 41.7 45.0 58.1 53.4 49.3 
France 11.2 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 40.3 39.3 50.9 54.4 53.4 
Germany* 10.0a 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 39.1 44.6 47.3 57.1 46.8 
Italy n.a. 11.1 c 22.5 c 24.5 c 30.1 34.7 37.9 50.8 52.3 48.5 
Netherlands n.a. 9.0 c 13.5 c 19.0 c 33.7 43.9 47.9 62.4 59.6 48.6 
Spain n.a. 11.0 c 8.3 c 13.2 c 18.8 21.3 23.1 40.5 46.0 38.6 
Sweden n.a. 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 42.8 48.1 59.4 66.8 57.3 
UK 9.9 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 39.3 44.8 42.9 45.2 43.9 
USA n.a. 7.5 12.1 19.7 27.0 30.3 31.7 36.3 35.7 36.5d 
Japan 9.0b 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 19.2 24.5 32.7 36.3 38.2e 
Sources: adapted from Maddison (1995) for 1880, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) for 1913-1960, OECD (1999) 
for 1968-1995, OECD (2005a) for 2004. Notes: For 1913 and 1920: general government expenditures. 
*:Western Germany for 1960-1987. a: 1881. b: 1885. c: central government. d: 2003. e: 2002. Because the table 
is aggregated from various sources, slight differences in the definition across years can appear. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follow. Section two reviews the main 
developments in tax levels and structures over the last decade. Section three highlights the 
trends towards more employment-friendly and simpler taxes. Section four discusses the 
challenges of ageing and globalisation on European social models and the quest for 
alternative tax bases to finance them. Section five concludes. 
                                                 
3  For example, as discussed by Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997), most of the 19th century was characterised by low 
levels of government expenditure, reflecting the dominant doctrine of Laissez-faire, itself possibly a 
consequence of 18th century's interventionism. See also Musgrave (1985) for an enlightening review of history of 
fiscal doctrine.  
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2. Structure of taxation in the European Union.  
 
2.1. Total tax burden: turning the tide? 
Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, total tax burden in percentage of GDP4 
has soared in the European Union5. On average, the rate of growth was of half a percentage 
point per year during the 1970s, a period of rapid growth of public expenditures. The growth 
of the total tax burden slowed down in the 1980s – with an average annual growth of less than 
a tenth of a percentage point per year – before growing again in the 1990s at an annual 
average rate of 0.3 percentage-points. The total tax-to-GDP in Europe peaked at the turn of 
the century before decreasing by 0.2 percentage-points per year on average. The latest data 
however show a pickup at the current end. Overall, the tax ratio is by now at the same level as 
ten yeas ago. 
Figure (1): Total taxes (including SSC) in percentage of GDP. 
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Source: European Commission (2006). Note the statistical break due to a change in classification at Eurostat. 
All data are GDP-weighted. Europe refers to the GDP-weighted average for Member States in the respective 
years. 
When looking at the evolution of individual countries, several exceptions stand out. 
First, some countries have been particularly successful to stabilise their total tax-to-GDP ratio 
either from the 1970s – this is the case of Ireland and United Kingdom – and this at levels 
around 35%, or from the 1980s – such as Germany (at about 40%), Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands (all at about 45%). Second, the level of taxes in the economy has 
dramatically increased – by some 10 percentage-points – in Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s, although starting at comparatively low levels. The same 
'catch-up' effect occurred in Cyprus and Malta over the last decade. Third, for the most recent 
period, some of the recent Member States have experienced important decreases in their total 
                                                 
4 Despite its simplicity – or rather because of it – the total tax-to-GDP ratio remains a rough indicator that carries 
interesting summary information but also suffers from deficiencies. It cannot be seen in isolation of the level of 
public expenditures and of the use of other alternative means for government intervention such as regulation. 
Moreover, total tax revenues convey very little information on the impact – in terms of distortions and in terms 
of redistribution – of tax systems.  
5 Several data limitations put constraints on the analysis. First, tax data for the EU-15 is only available from 
1980. An indicator for 'Europe' is available from 1970 and is an average for each year for the countries that were 
member of the European Union (or Community) during this year. Second, data for the ten member states that 
joined the EU in 2004 (and hence an EU-25 indicator) is only available from 1995. Third, ESA-95 data for 
Bulgaria and Romania exist only for the most recent years. Finally, there is a statistical break around 1995 due to 
the change in classification at Eurostat as the statistics changed from the ESA-79 to the ESA-95 classification. 
The GDP-weighted data for the EU-15 and the EU-25 (or EU-27) are very similar. Unless specified otherwise, 
EU-15 data are used – because of longer time-series – but the conclusions can be transposed to the EU-25 or EU-
27. Most data are available until 2004 or 2005. Most of the figures use GDP-weighted figures. One advantage is 
that those measures are representative of the EU as a whole. One drawback is that those figures are driven by the 
large Member States and that dispersion could be under-estimated. 
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tax burdens. This is the case of the Slovak republic (about 10 p.p.), Estonia (7 p.p.), Latvia 
(about 4 p.p.), Poland and Hungary (both about 3 p.p.). Interestingly, the bulk of these 
changes have occurred in the second half of the 1990s.  
Figure (2): Total taxes (including SSC) in percentage of GDP in 1995 and 2005. 
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Source: European Commission (2006).OECD (2005b). US and Japan: 1995 and 2003. 
Finally, about half of the Member States have experienced a decrease in their tax-to-
GDP ratio between 2000 and 2005. This decrease was especially marked in Germany, Greece, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Slovak republic, and Sweden. In 2005, latest year available, the 
GDP-weighted average for the EU-27 was at 39.6%. It ranges from 28.0% in Romania to 
51.3% in Sweden. 
2.2. Tax systems in the European Union rest on three pillars. 
Most tax systems in the world rely on three pillars: direct income taxes, indirect taxes 
on consumption and social security contributions. The European Union does not differ in that 
respect, although it generally relies proportionally more on consumption taxes (because of its 
developed VAT system) and on social security contribution than other developed economies 
(OECD, 2001). The respective shares of these three components have been quite close over 
time, staying within the 30-35% range. Direct taxes are quite volatile and largely influenced 
by the business cycle. The ratio of indirect taxes to GDP steadily increased until 1999 before 
slightly levelling off in the most recent years (but the share of indirect taxes in the total has 
increased over the last decade). This increase is due to developments in VAT collection that 
represented about 5% of GDP in 1970 to reach over 7% in 1999, partly explained by the 
creation of VAT systems in Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Greece (1987) and Finland (1995). 
At 13.8% of GDP and 35% of total taxes, indirect taxes remain the main source of tax 
revenues in the European Union, followed by direct taxes at 13% of GDP (or 33% of total 
taxes). There also seems to be a trend in recent years towards more reliance on indirect taxes, 
as exemplified most recently by the German decision to increase VAT by three points and use 
part of the proceeds to cut social contributions.  
Social security contributions constitute a third important source of taxes. EU Member 
States increasingly relied on social security contributions until the mid-1990s, with a change 
in 1996-1998 when the need to decrease labour costs materialised in a decline in social 
 6
security contributions6. However, measures were mostly targeted or of limited scope so that 
little if any marked reduction in EU averages is visible since the turn of the century. 
Figure (3): direct taxes, indirect taxes and SSC in % of GDP. 
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Source: European Commission (2006). 
Note the statistical break due to a change in classification at Eurostat. All data are GDP-weighted. 
 
The structure of taxation varies widely across countries. The share of indirect taxes in 
total taxation varies from about 30% in Belgium and in Germany to around 50% in Bulgaria 
and Cyprus. Direct taxes take on less than 20% of total taxes collected in Bulgaria and 
Romania but reach over 62% in Denmark. Finally, social security contributions represent only 
about 2.2% of the total in Denmark but over 40% of the total in Germany and Czech 
Republic.7  
Figure (4a): share of indirect taxes in total taxation (2005). 
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6  This development seems however mainly driven by a reduction in social security contributions for employees 
in France and in the Netherlands. It is unclear whether labour cost as declined as those measures have been 
partially compensated by personal income tax (Netherlands) or surcharges (so-called CSG in France). 
7 Some statistical facts stand out. While the correlation between the share of indirect taxes and the two 
alternative sources of taxation is only about -.25, the correlation between social security contributions and direct 
taxation reaches -.87, indicating some form of trade-off between these two forms of revenues and probably 
reflecting a choice in the source of financing of social security expenditures as well as the fact that indirect taxes 
are relatively harmonized across Member States. This is confirmed by the correlations between these sources in 
percentage of GDP. The correlation between direct taxation and social security contributions is -.37, while it is 
.51 with indirect taxation. The correlation between indirect taxation and social security contribution is not 
economically significant at -.06.  Second, while the correlation between the level of total taxes in percentage of 
GDP and the share of social security contribution is low (at -.09), there is a strong positive correlation between 
that level and the share of direct taxes (.43) and an even stronger negative correlation with the share of indirect 
taxes (-.70). This could be an indication that large governments might be mainly financed by larger direct taxes.  
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Figure (4b): share of direct taxes in total taxation (2005). 
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Figure (4c): share of social security contributions in total taxation (2005). 
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Source: European Commission (2006), EU-27 is GDP-weighted. PT: direct taxes for 2004. 
 
2.3. Taxing labour, capital or consumption. 
Tax revenues from labour, capital and consumption in percentage of GDP have not 
shown major changes since the 1980s. Taxes on labour represent about 20-21% of GDP, 
while the weight of taxes on capital – contrary to common believe – has actually slightly 
increased from 6-7% to 9% of GDP. Finally, taxes on consumption make up for 10-11% of 
GDP. Differences in taxes as a percentage of GDP between economic functions do not 
necessarily mean that one source is more taxed than another. This is because their bases may 
well have different weights in the economy. To account for these different weights, one needs 
to compute implicit tax rates (or 'backward-looking effective tax rates ‘) which allot each tax 
to its respective tax base. The implicit tax rate on labour shows a less positive picture of the 
overall reduction in the burden of labour taxation as the decline is much less marked and more 
or less stopped after 2001, although some progress has been made in reducing the tax wedge 
on the lowest incomes. One shall also note that the implicit corporate tax rate – a sub-category 
of capital taxation – mimics the (cyclical) trend of capital taxation. 
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Figure (5): labour, capital and consumption taxes in 
% GDP. 
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Figure (6): implicit tax rates for several economic 
functions. 
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Source: European Commission (2006). EU-15 is GDP-weighted. 
Taxes on consumption carry a relatively similar weight across Member States, but 
there is much more variation across Member States in the taxation of labour and capital8. 
Taxes on labour vary from slightly above 10% of GDP in Cyprus and Malta to over 30% in 
Sweden. There is also more variation over time as the weight of labour taxation in GDP 
decreased since the mid-1990s in most countries. EU Member States still largely rely on taxes 
on labour but they differ as whether those taxes are borne by employees or employers. On 
average, about 42% of the total taxes on employed workers are paid by employers but this 
share varies from 2% in Denmark to 60% in a range of countries. Interestingly, labour market 
reforms targeting employed workers have been focussed on reducing the burden for either 
employers or employees, but rarely both, and a decrease in the tax burden for one source was 
often partially offset by an increase in the tax burden for the other. 
Figure (7a): taxes on capital in % GDP. 
Averages 1995-2004
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
LU IT UK BE EL FR NL CY ES EU-
25
PT MT IE FI PL AT CZ DK SE DE SK HU LV SI EE LT
%
 G
D
P
Income of corporations Income of households Income of self-employed Stock (wealth) of capital . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  The coefficients of variation for consumption, labour and capital are 12.9, 29.3 and 35.7% respectively. 
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Figure (7b): taxes on consumption in % GDP. 
Averages 1995-2004
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Figure (7c): taxes on labour in % GDP. 
Averages 1995-2004
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Source: European Commission (2006). EU-25 is GDP-weighted 
2.4. Do the Newly-accessed Member States differ from the EU-15? 
The recent accessions of new Member States have fuelled some debates in the 'old' 
Member States because statutory rates – notably on companies – were perceived to be 
substantially lower in the new Member States. In addition, some of the new Member States 
have cut taxes aggressively, introducing e.g. zero rates on retained profits, or embraced 
inherently less progressive tax models such as the so-called flat tax regime. This perceived 
feeling of tax competition was also fuelling fears of a failure to finance social model(s). 
Comparing tax collection in percentage of GDP in the EU-15 and the NMS-10 
exposes interesting facts (see table 2). First, taxes in the new Member States are indeed lower 
than in the EU-15 between 1995 and 2004, with a ratio of total taxes-to-GDP in the NMS-10 
constantly about 5 percentage-points below that of the EU-15. This difference in level can be 
almost fully attributed to lower direct taxes in the new Member States, where the levels in 
percentage of GDP are almost half of the ones in the EU-159. This difference has fuelled 
discussions about a possible risk of corporate tax competition to attract capital.  
                                                 
9  All NMS-10 have lower direct taxes to GDP ratios (from 6.1% in Slovak Republic to 9.4% in Czech Republic 
and 12.4% in Malta in 2004) than the EU-25 average (12.9% in 2004). However, there are also marked 
differences as for example the Central European New Member States (with the exception of Slovak Republic) 
tend to have tax ratios that are closer to the EU-15 average than the Baltics. 
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Figure (8): Evolution of statutory corporate income tax rates in the European Union. 
Statutory corporate tax rates in the European Union
(incl. Local taxes and surcharges)
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Source: de Mooij and Nicodème (2006). The rates include local taxes and applicable surcharges. 
During the past two decades, statutory corporate tax rates in Europe have fallen 
considerably, with a drop of the average tax rate in the EU-15 from slightly below 50% in 
1985 to 30% in 2006. The decline in corporate tax rates has induced fears of a race-to-the-
bottom in the European Union, i.e. a process in which competing governments successively 
undercut each others tax rates in order to attract mobile tax bases10.  
Looking at the data, and contrary to common belief, the bulk of the difference in direct 
tax-to-GDP ratios is to be attributed to a lower collection of personal income taxes in new 
Member States, and not to lower corporate income taxes. Moreover, while personal income 
taxes in percentage of GDP is clearly below the level of the EU-15 (5.0% compared to 9.4%), 
the ratio of corporate income taxes to GDP in the NMS-10 still tops the one in the EU-15 
(2.5% compared to 2.4%). However, some statistical artifices distort the comparison. In 
particular, in some large Member States such as Germany, the vast majority of companies do 
not pay the corporate income tax but their owners are taxed instead at the personal income 
tax, which artificially drives down the EU-15 average corporate tax-to-GDP. The arithmetic 
average personal income tax-to-GDP for the EU-15 and the NMS-10 is 10.4% and 5.7% in 
2004 respectively, confirming the large difference. Furthermore, although the respective 
values for corporate income tax to GDP are 3.1% in the EU-15 and 2.7% in the NMS-10, this 
difference grows significantly if one excludes Cyprus and Malta, as the NMS-10 ratio falls to 
2.3%11. Furthermore, the economies of the New Member States have been growing very fast, 
which boosts their tax revenues from capital. 
All in all, the data are relatively inconclusive about the extent and the effects of 
corporate tax competition that could threaten tax collection. In particular, it is difficult to 
assess to what extent the above-mentioned factors are responsible for the fact that so far we 
do not observe a visible and marked erosion of tax collection. The large differences in 
statutory tax rates might also reflect a stronger choice towards lower rates and larger bases in 
the new Member States. However, there are limits to base widening as it cannot offset forever 
continuing rate cuts. Another problem is that very low corporate income tax rates threaten the 
                                                 
10 Enlargement has reinforced such fears as new Member States apply corporate tax rates that have gradually 
reached levels of more than 10%-points lower than in the EU-15 countries. See Nicodème (2007a) for a review 
of the literature on corporate tax competition. See also de Mooij and Nicodème (2006) for a discussion on 
corporate tax rates and bases developments. 
11  This said, the implicit tax rates on consumption, on labour and on corporate income are all higher in the 
NMS-10. One noticeable difference is that the implicit tax rate on capital is much higher in the EU-15, indicating 
that wealth and capital income of self-employed is more heavily taxed. Those figures shall be taken with caution 
because of a lack of data for several countries. 
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so-called "backstop function" of that tax, which is to protect personal income tax revenue 
from the risk of individuals subject to personal income tax acquire the legal form of 
corporations to reduce their tax bill; if this happens the erosion of tax revenues would be more 
apparent in the revenue from the personal income tax rather than from the corporate income 
tax12.  
 
3.  Recent trends in tax reforms. 
 
Over the last years, Member States have carried out important reforms of their tax 
systems. These reforms were driven by several factors. First, high unemployment rates and 
low participation rates represent a loss of human capital and create social tensions. European 
Labour markets are distorted by taxes and Member States have sought to create a more 
employment-friendly labour taxation. Doing this, they have also faced the difficulty of finding 
alternative tax bases to finance their expenditures. Second, the recent trend has been towards 
simpler tax systems, maybe driven by the need to reduce marginal tax rates while keeping 
revenues constant. 
3.1. Employment-friendly labour taxation. 
Taxation is a source of distortion in the labour markets and will affect both the supply 
of and the demand for labour13. The impact of taxes on wages and employment depends on 
the interactions between labour supply and demand, labour market structure and the 
institutional design such as the wage bargaining process. Taxes and social security 
contributions drive a wedge between the cost for the employer and the net compensation 
received by the employee. Although theoretically such tax can increase or decrease labour 
supply, depending on which of the income and substitution effect dominates, empirical 
evidence points to a negative impact of labour taxes, albeit with different magnitude for 
different groups of workers. In particular, the effect seems largest for the second member of 
the household and for lone-parent families. In parallel to the effect of labour taxation on 
labour supply, taxes and social security contributions, to the extent they are reflected in higher 
labour costs will also decrease labour demand as costs increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  See de Mooij and Nicodème (2006) for a discussion. 
13  See Carone and Salomaki (2001) for a review. 
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Table (2): taxes in percentage of GDP in the EU-15. 
 EU-15 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
           
Total taxes 39.8 40.6 40.9 40.9 41.4 41.3 40.3 39.6 39.7 39.6 
           
Indirect taxes 13.4 13.5 13.6 14.1 14.4 14.2 13.8 13.7 13.7 13.8 
Of which           
VAT 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Excise duties 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 
Other taxes on 
products 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Other taxes on 
production 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 
           
Direct taxes 12.5 13.0 13.3 13.7 14.1 14.3 13.9 13.3 13.1 13.1 
Of which           
Personal income 
taxes 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.9 10.1 10.1 10.0 9.7 9.6 9.4 
Corporate 
income taxes 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 
Other direct 
taxes 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
           
Social Security 
Contributions 14.0 14.2 14.0 13.1 13.1 12.9 12.7 12.7 12.9 12.8 
Of which           
Paid by 
employers 7.5 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3 
Paid by 
employees 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.0 
Of self-
employed 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
           
Implicit taxes           
Consumption 19.9 19.8 20.0 20.1 20.4 20.1 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 
Labour 36.9 37.4 37.4 37.5 37.2 37.1 36.7 36.3 36.6 36.5 
Capital 26.0 28.0 29.2 29.9 32.8 33.1 31.5 30.2 30.1 n.a. 
Corporate 
income 17.8 20.2 22.3 21.2 23.7 23.8 24.5 21.9 20.8 n.a. 
Source: European Commission (2006). GDP-weighted averages. Totals may be affected by rounding
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Table (2bis): taxes in percentage of GDP in the NMS-10. 
 EU-15 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
           
Total taxes 38.0 36.8 36.2 35.8 36.0 34.7 34.5 34.9 34.6 34.5 
           
Indirect taxes 14.6 14.5 13.9 13.7 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.7 
Of which           
VAT 6.3 6.4 6.8 6.7 7.1 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.7 
Excise duties 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 
Other taxes on 
products 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Other taxes on 
production 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.2 
           
Direct taxes 10.7 9.8 9.9 9.6 8.2 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.0 7.8 
Of which           
Personal income 
taxes 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 
Corporate 
income taxes 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Other direct 
taxes 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 
           
Social Security 
Contributions 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.6 13.9 13.2 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.2 
Of which           
Paid by 
employers 8.4 8.1 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.2 
Paid by 
employees 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 5.6 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6 
Of self-
employed 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 
           
Implicit taxes           
Consumption 23.0 22.2 21.1 20.9 21.3 20.4 19.5 20.4 20.9 21.7 
Labour 38.4 37.7 37.5 37.3 39.0 36.9 36.9 37.0 36.9 38.9 
Capital 22.1 19.5 21.2 18.4 20.7 20.8 21.0 22.4 19.8 n.a. 
Corporate 
income 29.4 22.3 28.8 21.7 34.5 29.8 31.1 32.4 21.2 n.a. 
Source: European Commission (2006). GDP-weighted averages. Totals may be affected by rounding
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Table (3) Total tax wedge on labour. 
Single person without children at average wage (100% AW) 
 2000 2005 Difference Part PIT (2005) 
Part SSC 
employee 
(2005) 
Part SSC 
employer 
(2005) 
Austria 47.3 47.4 0.1 10.9 14.0 22.6 
Belgium 57.1 55.4 -1.7 21.4 10.7 23.3 
Czech rep. 42.7 43.8 1.1 8.6 9.3 25.9 
Germany 53.9 51.8 -2.2 17.3 17.3 17.3 
Denmark 44.3 41.4 -3.0 30.2 10.6 0.5 
Greece 38.4 38.8 0.4 4.3 12.5 21.9 
Spain 38.6 39.0 0.4 10.7 4.9 23.4 
Finland 47.8 44.6 -3.2 20.1 5.1 19.4 
France 49.6 50.1 0.5 10.8 9.6 29.7 
Hungary 52.7 50.5 -2.2 14.3 10.0 26.3 
Ireland 28.9 25.7 -3.2 11.4 4.7 9.7 
Italy 46.4 45.4 -1.0 13.6 6.9 24.9 
Luxembourg 38.2 35.3 -2.9 11.1 12.3 11.9 
Netherlands 39.7 38.6 -1.1 9.5 19.7 9.5 
Poland 43.2 43.6 0.3 5.3 21.3 17.0 
Portugal 37.3 36.2 -1.1 8.1 8.9 19.2 
Sweden 50.1 47.9 -2.2 18.1 5.3 24.5 
Slovak rep. 41.8 38.3 -3.4 6.9 10.6 20.8 
UK 32.1 33.5 1.4 15.7 8.2 9.6 
EU* 45.2 44.4 -0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
USA 29.7 29.1 -0.6 14.6 7.3 7.3 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report. * GDP-weighted average for those countries above. From January 2005, 
Slovak Republic has introduced the fully funded pillar. Under this system, 9 percentage point of the social 
security contributions paid by the employer to the pension insurance go directly to pension funds and not to the 
social insurance company as previously. The pension funds are treated outside of the general government so that 
these contributions are not accounted for in the OECD calculations. Hence, the 2005 employers' social security 
contributions are assumed to be 26.2% (OECD, taxing wages report). 
As documented in table (3), tax wedges on labour remain high in most countries, 
reaching 50% in several Member States. Looking at the size and components of the tax 
wedge, it can be seen that the lion's share (about 45%) of the total tax wedge is accounted for 
by employers' social security contributions, while the remaining is made up of personal 
income taxes (30%) and employee's social security contributions (25%). This situation 
contrasts with the US, for which the total tax wedge is about a third lower than in Europe and 
equally borne by personal income taxes and social security contributions14. 
                                                 
14 The possible consequences of a shift from social security contributions to general taxation are an issue of 
discussion. The traditional view is that all the components of the tax wedge on labour cost, that is personal 
income tax, employers' and employees' social security contributions and consumption taxes, have the same 
impact on wages (the so-called Invariance of Incidence Proposition), so that any change in the composition of 
the tax wedge (for any given level of tax wedge) does not affect labour costs and hence labour markets outcome. 
There is however a wide and increasing strand of the literature that shows that even revenue neutral shift of taxes 
on labour can alter the labour market outcome (see Rasmussen, 1997a, 1997b). With reference to the degree of 
shift of social security contributions on wages, it is worth stressing that this is not only a function of the real 
wage downward or upward rigidity and the bargaining power of wage earners, but it is also a function of the 
degree to which workers value the benefits linked to the payment of social security contributions. If workers take 
into account the benefits that they are buying with their payroll taxes - i.e. they consider the reduction of their 
after tax wage as counterpart of the financing of an insurance - any change (increase) in the payroll tax will lead 
to a lower change (increase) in wages, a smaller change in compensation costs and, thus, a lower impact on 
employment. For example, in countries where the pension system is characterized by a close link between 
benefits and contributions (so-called "Bismarckian" systems), pension contributions are a form of mandatory 
saving, and people may not regard them as a tax, unless and to the extent that they are higher than would be 
required to obtain the same amount of retirement income by other means (see Cigno, 2006). Thus, by enabling 
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Member States have carried out many reforms, with a majority of them paying 
particular attention to the reduction of taxes on labour for low-skilled workers and making 
work pay. The reductions in personal income taxes and social security contributions have 
often been accompanied by increases in tax allowances. In 2005, the GDP-weighted personal 
income taxes in the EU-27 were at 9.2% of GDP, the same level as 1995. In the same period, 
social security contributions paid by employers decreased from 7.5% to 7.3% of GDP and 
those paid by employees declined from 4.7% to 4.0% of GDP. The total decline in taxation of 
labour corresponds therefore to about slightly more than 1% of GDP15. 
Figure (9): Evolution of the components of labour taxation in % GDP 1995-2004. 
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Source: European Commission (2006). EU-25 is GDP-weighted. Portugal: 1995-2003.  
Slovak republic: 1995-2003 for personal income taxes. 
 
3.2. Tax simplification and tax-cuts-cum-base-widening tax reforms. 
Recently, Member States have shown a trend towards simplifying their tax systems. In 
the absence of comprehensive tax reforms, targeted tax reforms may have accumulated and 
rendered the system very complicated with sometimes measures with conflicting effects. Tax 
systems are frequently used to provide a favourable treatment to specific tax-payers or 
activities. These special provisions are called 'tax expenditures' and can take various forms16. 
Governments may provide exemptions for certain types of income. They can also take the 
form of deductions from taxable income, tax credits, and special rates relief, accounting 
conventions or deferral possibilities. Such tax expenditures are not always easy to detect or 
quantify but they are considered to be sizeable. They are a substitute for direct cash or in-kind 
public expenses and can be a powerful instrument to encourage certain types of behaviour that 
are deemed desirable by tax authorities. Examples include encouraging home-ownership, 
supporting private gifts to charities, pushing for energy-saving investment, or trying to raise 
maternity rates. Going through the tax system may be a good idea if this requires less 
marginal administrative costs compared to setting up new specific programs. However, the 
experience with tax expenditures calls for caution. Tax expenditures may sometimes induce 
                                                                                                                                                        
individuals to see more clearly the link between the contributions and benefits, one can reduce any adverse 
incentive effects arising from a failure to see the link”. To sum up, if workers value the benefits that they are 
buying with their payroll taxes, the impact of this change on the employment will be more limited, if any (see 
Arpaia and Carone, 2004).   
15  This is of course a broad estimate that does not control for the economic cycle, nor for the share of wages in 
the economy. The analysis per country does not reveal strong correlations between the components, except a 
negative one between social security contributions of employers and of employees. 
16  Hagemann, Jones and Montador (1987). See OECD (1996) for a review of some practices. 
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effects that are in opposition to the intended ones17 and they in addition may distort the 
features of income tax systems. Deductibility is indeed often done at the highest marginal 
income tax rate, meaning that high-revenues taxpayers benefit the most from those measures. 
This can dramatically reduce the effective progressivity of tax systems. In addition, they are 
subject to less public or parliamentary scrutiny than direct expenditures, which make them 
popular to lobbies, and they complicate the tax system. Their level is also more subject to 
cyclical and behavioural fluctuations than fixed direct expenditure18. Finally, they narrow the 
tax base, which limits the scope for tax rates reductions and may decrease efficiency. Such tax 
expenditures shall therefore rather been used by parsimony and in well-defined situations19.  
A parallel trend has been to accompany the simplification of the tax system – allowing 
often for a widening of the tax base – with a reduction of marginal tax rates. For personal 
income taxes, one has observed a clear reduction in the number of tax brackets with a 
decrease in marginal tax rates either at the low-end or at the top-end, if not both. The base-
widening-cum-tax-cuts strategy has obviously also been applied to corporate taxes for which 
statutory rates have declined and the tax base has widened – for a great deal thanks to the 
abolition of a multitude of special regime (sometimes within the framework of the code of 
conduct). Turning to international activities, we have seen above that the absence of a 
multilateral tax treaty or common rules in personal income taxation is an important hurdle to 
labour mobility in Europe. A similar problem applies with taxation of capital as studies show 
that exchange of information between tax authorities is not well-developed20. There seem also 
to be large difficulties in VAT, despite the harmonization of the tax base and cooperation 
between tax authorities. A recent survey21 on 700 European companies stressed difficulties for 
repayment and refund of VAT, especially coping with procedures for refunds, such that an 
estimated 53.5% of large companies have not requested refunding at some point. Finally, in 
the specific case of corporate income taxation, the difficulty to deal with 27 accounting and 
tax systems, the uncertainties in the treatment of transfer pricing as well as the general 
absence of cross-border loss relief are seen as a major tax obstacle to doing business on a pan-
European basis.  
An interesting case in the trends towards simplification is the flat tax which cumulates 
some of the arguments developed here above as its proponents see it as reducing the burden 
on labour and stimulating labour supply, reducing the tax on high-wage workers to avoid their 
move, and simplifying the tax system. Personal income tax systems in most developed 
countries have increasingly been perceived by public opinions as too complicated with many 
variables to account for and a high compliance cost. This perception also coincides with 
trends towards downsizing the role of governments. Hence, the belief that simple taxation is 
necessarily good taxation has emerged. The same drift believes that the existence of multiple 
tax brackets is itself a factor in the complexity of the tax systems while in fact this is the 
simplest part of the tax declaration and computation22. Given this background, one form of 
taxation has naturally attracted a lot of attention over the last years: the flat tax. The flat tax 
                                                 
17  This can be for example the case in housing taxation where tax deductibility of mortgage interest and/or 
capital payments – a measure intended to help first-time owners – may simply translate into higher property 
prices. 
18  Arguably, this may be a good thing if counter-cyclical. 
19  Removing tax expenditure may however prove politically difficult because losers are large and concentrated 
while winners are dispersed. 
20  See Keen and Ligthart (2005, 2006). 
21  European Commission (2004). 
22  Hagemann, Jones and Montador (1987, page 11). The authors note however that multiple rates provide 
incentives to smooth revenues between years and individuals, leading to necessary rules on income shifting, 
which may add complexity. 
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debate really started in 1983 following the release of Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka’s book 
on flat tax. The debate was rather US-centred – given the complexity of the US tax code – and 
attracted publicity during the 1992 and 1996 US presidential campaigns. It regained vigour in 
the recent years in the EU with enlargement to countries that have adopted such a system. 
Most scholars date the beginning of the flat tax experiment in 1994 in Estonia, which 
introduced a single uniform rate of 26% on personal incomes. Actually, some dependent 
territories seem to have introduced such a system as soon as the 1940’s. Today, at least 
twenty-two countries (of which five current Member States) have introduced a flat tax, but the 
detailed provisions vary a lot across countries23. Discussions on the flat tax have also occurred 
in many western European countries but in all countries, "a notable and troubling feature (…) 
is that it has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence"24. 
Table (4): Flat taxes on personal income in the world. 
Country Flat Tax Rate Year of 
introduction 
Country Flat Tax Rate Year of 
introduction 
Jersey 20% (i) 1940 Iraq 15% 2004 
Hong Kong 16% (ii) 1947 Slovak rep. 19% (vii) 2004 
Guernsey 20% (i),(iii) 1947 Georgia 12% (x) 2005 
Jamaica 25% 1980 Romania 16% 2005 
Bolivia 10%(iv) 1986 Kyrgyzstan 10% 2006 
Estonia 26% (v) 1994 Paraguay 10%(xi) 2006 
Lithuania 33% (vi) 1994 Macedonia 12% (xii) 2007 
Latvia 25% (vi) 1995 Iceland 35.73% (xiii) 2007 
Russia 13% (vii) 2001 Mongolia 10% 2007 
Serbia 14% (viii) 2003 Mauritius 15% 2009 
Ukraine 13% (ix) 2004 Tonga 10%(xiv) n.a. 
Source: Rabushka (2007), The Economist (2005), Teather (2005), Grecu (2004), Bird (1992). Tax rates at the time of 
introduction. (i) Applied to personal and corporate incomes for both Jersey and Guernsey. None have VAT. The channels 
islands do not tax dividends, interest or capital gains. (ii) Taxpayers have the choice between being taxed at a 16% flat tax or 
under a progressive tax system with marginal tax rates ranging from 2 to 20%. Hong Kong does not tax dividends, wealth, 
and capital gains and has no VAT, sales tax or payroll tax. (iii) Capped at £250,000, making it therefore regressive as soon 
as revenues reach £1,250,000. From 2007, the corporate tax rate is reduced to zero. (iv) 13% since 1992. The tax base is all 
income (wages, salaries, rentals, interest, royalties, etc.), except foreign-income and capital gains which remain tax-free. 
There is also a general allowance equivalent to two (previously four) monthly minimum wages (this minimum wage is about 
Bs 240 or USD 45). The system is designed to fight VAT fraud, so that individuals can offset against this tax the VAT paid, 
provided they have invoices or receipts. (v) Reduced to 24% in 2005, 23% in 2006, 21% in 2007, 20% in 2008. Estonia has a 
zero corporate tax rate on retained earnings but taxes distribution (mainly dividends) at 21%. This is accompanied by a 
general non-deductibility of interest payments. (vi) Both Lithuania and Latvia’s corporate tax rates are set at 15% in 2007. 
(vii) Accompanied by a 24% corporate tax rate. (viii) On both corporate and personal incomes. (ix) 15% since 2007. (x) With 
no basic allowance. (xi) VAT paid is tax deductible. (xii) 10% from 2008. (xiii) Corporate tax rate is at 18% and capital 
income taxed at 10% under a Dual Income Tax System. (xiv) Above 2,500 USD. The date of implementation is unknown. The 
following countries have no tax on personal income: Andorra, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Burundi, Cayman Islands, 
Kuwait, Monaco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Vanuatu. 
Flat taxes seem particularly attractive because their proponents propose low levels of 
tax rates. However, one problem with this is that the low rates are not by themselves a 
characteristic of the flat tax. Another argument is that flat taxes are attractive because they are 
transparent and easy to administrate. Transparency is indeed an interesting feature of the flat 
tax, notably because each worker knows about its marginal tax rate (something more difficult 
to assess in a progressive tax system). It shall be nevertheless said that because social security 
contributions continue to be non-proportional due to ceilings or progressivity, and because 
                                                 
23  See Nicodème (2007b) for a review. Note that no country has adopted anything close to the original pure form 
of the Hall and Rabushka proposal which combined a cash-flow tax on business income with a single marginal 
tax rate on personal income. Both taxed at the same rate. In this system, real investments are immediately 
expensed (that is depreciation is 100% in the first year) while financial investments are exempted. This proposal 
is essentially an expenditure tax. 
24  Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006). 
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these contributions have generally gained importance in countries having adopted a flat tax 
structure, effective taxation on labour is far from being flat in practice25. Flat taxes are also 
easy to administrate because they are usually accompanied by a removal of most (complex) 
tax deductions from the tax base to replace them with a general tax allowance. However, it is 
difficult to quantify the exact saving by tax administrations and the few studies available so 
far tend to give unrealistically high estimates.  
Proponents of the flat tax also claim that it raises more tax revenues, because of an 
alleged Laffer curve effect. It is indeed true that tax revenues have increased in some 
countries after the flat tax has been introduced - albeit not in all of them – but research has not 
found Laffer effects or sizeable labour supply effects26. It seems that a large part of the 
outcome was due to the fact that the introduction of the flat tax was generally accompanied by 
stricter rules to combat tax fraud and improve compliance. It is therefore far from being clear-
cut whether these positive results can be reproduced in all countries, especially those with 
allegedly lower tax fraud. Next, reforms towards flat taxes are not neutral in terms of 
redistribution. These effects obviously depend on the details of each single proposal. 
However, flat tax reforms tend to favour the lower-end and top-end classes of revenues whilst 
increasing the tax burden on the middle-class27. Finally, because there is a tax-free allowance, 
a flat tax is still a progressive tax (maybe less sharp than in the case of a progressive system 
with several tax brackets although here again it depends on the details of each system).  
At the end of the day, the choice of whether adopting a flat tax relates to the degree of 
redistribution that shall be achieved by taxation, the choice of how to tax capital and labour 
and the desired equity-efficiency trade-off. For some of the EU Member States, the level of 
revenues currently collected by the personal income tax is relatively high so that the flat tax 
system would have to apply a relatively high rate and a small allowance to be revenue-neutral. 
This is not necessarily a benign scenario, especially in terms of redistribution. 
 
4.  The challenges ahead. 
 
4.1. The consequences of ageing and globalisation. 
The demographic transition and ageing population in the EU raises many challenges 
and issues in terms of the structure of taxation. The economic impact of ageing will be severe 
and diverse28: productivity will become the predominant source of growth because of a 
shrinking working-age population leading (with unchanged policies) to a fall in potential 
growth rates. A key challenge will be to develop labour market policies and reforms in the tax 
and benefit systems aimed at increasing labour supply and further reforms of the welfare state 
that guarantee the long-term sustainability of public finances in the face of these demographic 
developments. What seems a likely development for the future is that the financing of the 
welfare state may have to rely less on labour taxes and, in case of a decline in savings arising 
                                                 
25  Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006), page 5. In particular, if social security contributions are taken into account. 
26  Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006). 
27  In a recent study for Germany, Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer (2007) use micro data to analyse the effects of a 
revenue-neutral flat tax on the German economy. They found that all scenarios - combining a flat rate and an 
allowance - yield an increase in inequality and redistribution in favour of the highest incomes. In most scenarios, 
the middle-class is the main loser and the poorest also somewhat loose. In terms of efficiency, all scenarios lead 
to a decrease in labour supply, the more so with lower marginal rates and smaller allowance. Finally, in terms of 
welfare, scenarios with high rates and high allowances lead to large decrease in welfare while those with low 
rates and allowances lead to small welfare gains but concentrated mainly in the highest decile. 
28  See Carone et al. (2005) and European Commission –EPC (2005) for a review.  
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from demographic transition, also less tax revenues from savings (although the net effect will 
also depend on interest rates).  
Taxes are used to finance public expenditure, among which social spending represents 
a sizeable share. In 2003, gross average social protection expenditure accounted for 28% of 
GDP in the EU-2529. The major share of it related to old age and survivors' benefits. This 
share was at 45.7% of the total on average but reached more than 50% in several Member 
States. In addition, expenditure on sickness and health care and on disability represented the 
second and third sources of social expenditure in the EU-25 with respectively 28.3% and 
8.0% of the total. The coming challenge of ageing is likely to increase the need for these 
categories of social spending and to decrease the labour tax base30. Empirical studies31 
suggest a negative correlation between the dependency ratio and both tax rates and the 
generosity of social transfers. They also suggest that the tax-contribution rates that would 
balance social security systems in the future are much higher than current statutory rates32. 
This therefore calls for reforms now as to avoid larger pains in the future.  
Another point of concern for tax authorities is the potential effects of globalisation and 
tax competition that could force them to shift the tax burden from (geographically) mobile to 
immobile tax bases. The impact of tax competition has been the focus of a sizeable amount of 
academic research33, especially in relation to corporate taxation. As we have seen above, 
statutory corporate tax rates in Europe have fallen considerably during the last 25 years and 
this decline in corporate tax rates has induced fears of a race-to-the-bottom in the European 
Union. This could ultimately erode corporate tax revenues and impose a threat to the 
financing of the European welfare states.  
One important question is of course whether the decline in corporate tax rates is the 
result of tax competition and whether there is a "race to the bottom". Several authors have 
tried to estimate whether jurisdictions of various natures were setting taxes in an 
interdependent fashion. Many studies found some form of interaction, although the choice of 
tax indicators is extremely important34. In addition, even if accepting that there are tax setting 
interactions, there is uncertainty in the literature about the reason behind these interactions, 
that is, whether it is the result of tax competition to attract mobile tax bases, treasury effects35, 
yardstick tax competition in which countries try to mimic each other’s tax policy or simply 
convergence across countries in economic structures and/or dominant economic thinking. 
Indeed, despite the reduction in corporate tax rates, corporate tax revenues have maintained 
remarkably stable and actually increased somewhat during the last decade.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  See Eurostat (2006). 
30 On the revenue side, the main sources of funding of social protection are social contributions with 60% and 
general government contributions derived from taxes at 37% in 2003 (Eurostat, 2006). The share of social 
contributions in the total receipts for funding social protection has declined over time, although remaining the 
main source, and general government contributions have increased in proportion. 
31  See Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, (2002). 
32  Razin, Sadka and Woon Hang (2005). 
33  See Nicodème (2007a) for a recent review with a focus on the European Union. 
34  Using tax collected in percentage of the tax base or of GDP does not show any interactions for example. 
35  Member States that host many foreign subsidiaries from countries applying a tax credit system have an 
incentive to closely follow the tax setting from those countries. This is because the tax ultimately paid by the 
parent will be its domestic tax, irrelevant of the tax rate applied in the country of the subsidiary (to the extent that 
the dividend is repatriated and that the foreign tax does not exceed the domestic tax liability). 
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Figure (10): Corporate income tax in percentage of GDP. 
Taxes on corporations as percentage of GDP (1980-2004)
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Apparently, the corporate tax base has broadened, which made up for the revenue 
losses from rate reductions. However, several studies suggest that base broadening is unlikely 
to have been sufficient to make up for the ex-ante revenue losses from rate reduction. An 
increase in the profitability of companies has been another candidate for (partially) explaining 
this puzzle. The problem is that measures do not univocally show a large increase in 
profitability. Finally, some studies36 point to the possibility that falling corporate tax rates and 
a widening of the gap between personal income and corporate income taxes have created 
incentives for entrepreneurs to incorporate. This is important because it means that one 
possible effect of corporate tax competition is to shift some tax revenues from the personal 
income to the corporate income. 
The mobility of capital can also take various forms, which render the analysis of a 
potential shift even more complicated. Usually, it is thought through the relocation or the 
development of real activities. For example, the median value of the semi-elasticity of tax to 
FDI shows that an increase in the tax rate by one percentage-point will reduce FDI inflows by 
2.9%37. Several other studies also show that taxation has an impact on location decision38. 
Furthermore, recent research39 has shown that profit-shifting activities in the form of transfer 
pricing or debt-shifting were sizeable. All this suggests that the mobility of capital may erode 
some tax bases, whether the capital one or even the labour tax base. The mobility of labour is 
even more complex to study. In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of special 
regimes for expatriates and wealthy workers. The general view however remains that taxation 
is a major obstacle to labour mobility alongside difficulties in social security and pension 
portability. The general recommendation of the OECD is that workers shall be taxed in the 
country where they spend 183 days a year. This rule does not apply however to the increasing 
                                                 
36  See de Mooij and Nicodème (2006). 
37  De Mooij and Everdeen (2006) 
38  For example, Devereux and Griffith (1998). 
39  See Huizinga and Laeven (2006) and Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2006). 
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number of workers who are sent across Europe for short-term missions as they may end up 
spending less than 183 days in any of the countries. They then have to refer to all bilateral tax 
treaties. This creates a lot of uncertainty and risks of no or double taxation, especially since 
the rules may differ across tax treaties and not all Member States has a tax treaty with all the 
others. The absence of a multilateral tax treaty or common rules is an important hurdle to 
labour mobility in Europe.  
The analysis of a possible tax shift from mobile to immobile tax bases is complex 
because the effects can take various forms. A more formal analysis by way of regressing the 
changes in the ratio of labour taxes in percentage of GDP on the changes in the ratio of capital 
taxes in percentage of GDP does not bring statistically significant results. Figures (5) and (6) 
above, respectively showing capital and labour in percentage of GDP and in percentage of 
their own tax base does not suggest either that a major shift may have occurred. More in-
depth analysis may however be needed. It is possible for example that the distinction between 
capital and labour as representing mobile and immobile tax bases is ill-defined and that the 
analysis shall have to distinguish between mobile and immobile categories in both capital and 
labour factors.  
More in-depth studies40 show that notwithstanding increasing integration and 
globalisation, there is still room for independent economic policies and that the views that 
globalisation has altered the composition of government expenditures and reduced its 
financing are not fully supported by empirical analysis. Several explanations have been put 
forward. First, the share of mobile activities in total taxes is still relatively small. Second, 
globalisation may equally increase profitability and hence tax revenues, for any given tax rate. 
Third, on the expenditure side, globalisation may increase the need for more social spending.  
In conclusion, globalisation and ageing have raised the issue of the financing of the 
European Social Model(s). Ageing will put more pressure on public spending and on some 
categories of tax revenues. At the same time, globalisation may render it increasingly difficult 
to collect taxes from mobile tax bases. The need for financing may well lead to a need to 
increase tax rates41. There is therefore a need to find alternative means of financing by ways 
of robust tax revenues. This may well request a more efficient tax structure that is broad, 
simple, non-fraud prone, and that allows Member States to pursue their objectives in term of 
equity and efficiency. The next section reviews several options. 
4.2. The quest for alternative tax bases. 
Various options for alternative tax bases are under discussion. Some of the main one 
concern a shift from low-income to high-income workers, a shift from labour to capital, an 
increasing use of environmental taxes, or greater reliance on immovable property or 
consumption as a tax base. Ideally, the new tax base shall be wide to be able to impose a low 
tax rate and minimize distortions, as well as stable as to ensure certainty in revenue collection. 
Some countries, starting from Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s, have 
introduced a dual income tax system that tax personal capital income at low and proportional 
tax rates while keeping higher and progressive tax rates on labour income. One of the 
objectives of such a move has been to reduce the incentives for capital exports and tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
Another change has been to reduce the tax burden on low-income. To guarantee the 
same amount of revenues, higher rates may be applied to high-income groups. According to 
some scholars, if the labour market is imperfectly competitive, increasing tax progressivity 
                                                 
40  Hines (2006), Dreher (2006), and Dreher, Sturm and Ursprung (2006). 
41  Reforms on the expenditure side are of course an important part of the policy. 
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will have a positive effect on employment because it stimulates wage moderation. 
Alternatively, if the labour market is competitive, such an increase will have a negative effect 
on employment because of the substitution effect from consumption to leisure. The overall 
effect ultimately depends on the respective wage elasticities of low-paid and high-paid 
workers. To the extent that it is much higher for workers at the low-end, an increase in 
progressivity may both increase employment and reduce the overall excess burden of the tax. 
There is however a growing constraint to this. The international mobility of skilled workers 
and the possibility to change the "label" of labour income (especially for self-employed) to 
capital income puts a limit to top marginal personal income tax rates.  
The debate has also revolved around the possibility of shifting the tax burden from 
labour to capital. Such a shift has been popular among some policy-makers because there is a 
perception that globalisation was shifting the tax burden the other way around and that some 
correcting measures would be politically desirable. Such move has not really happened so far 
because it faces two major constraints. First, the capital tax base is smaller than the labour tax 
base and would therefore require a much higher tax rate to be revenue-neutral, probably 
leading to big distortions. Second and foremost, capital is much more mobile and this creates 
difficulties to enforce taxation in the absence of international coordination. In addition, 
economic theory shows that the burden of taxing the mobile tax base (capital) ultimately falls 
on the immobile factors (labour and land) because, in the absence of location-specific rents, 
the emigration of the mobile factor lowers the productivity of the immobile ones. It will 
reduce domestic immobile factors incomes by more than the amount of the tax collected from 
the mobile factor and it would therefore be better to directly tax those immobile factors - 
especially because, by doing this, one avoids the additional tax distortion on the immobile 
factor42. 
An interesting alternative tax base is a tax on polluting activities. Environmental taxes 
are a classic case for applying Pigouvian taxation that discourages the consumption of de-
merit goods or "bads". A lot of ideas have been launched recently, especially as the debate on 
the need to act against global warming is heating up. For example, car taxation will be based 
to a large extent in the future on their emissions. Some proposals have also been made to 
modulate property taxes with the degree of insulation of the habitation or to tax products 
based on the pollution created by their fabrication process. It seems however that despite 
some remarkable exceptions, going from rhetoric to practice has proven hard in most Member 
States. Over the last ten years, the EU-25 GDP-weighted average level of environmental 
taxation has declined from 2.8% of GDP to 2.6%43. It is true that a sizeable amount of 
environmental non-tax instruments of command and control exist and that, in theory, an 
efficient green tax is one that deters polluting activities instead of collecting revenues (that is 
that the amount of the tax is optimally set at the level that internalises the externalities). 
However, the pessimistic view is that the low collection results rather from the fact that 
environmental taxes are not widely used.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42  Razin and Sadka (1991). Note that the incidence of a tax on savings can be different than the incidence of a 
tax on investment, especially if countries are price-taker. The same goes for the tax elasticity of FDI and of 
savings, which could be different and differ. One shall therefore qualify the type of capital that is considered. 
43  Environmental taxes fall into three main categories defined by the European Commission (2006): those on the 
use of energy, those on the use of transport, and those on polluting activities with 2.1%, 0.6% and 0.1% of GDP 
respectively for the EU-25 GDP-weighted 1995-2004 average. 
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Figure (11): environmental taxes in percentage of GDP. 
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Next, taxes on immovable properties (real estate) could be an alternative instrument to 
raise additional revenues because they are difficult to relocate. The share of taxes on 
immovable properties in total taxes remains low in most Member States at between 1 and 
3%44. One specific problem of property taxation is that, to favour home-ownership, some 
Member States are offering deductions of interest and/or capital payments to the personal 
income tax base. Those reductions have potential perverse effects as they may simply increase 
demand and prices45. Alternatively, registration taxes on properties create a sunk cost and may 
reduce the liquidity of the asset, with adverse consequences on the mobility of labour. Taxes 
on real estate also carry two additional problems. First, the tax is generally local in many 
Member States so that an increase of this type of taxes to finance a reduction in labour taxes 
may require institutional arrangements. Second, the valuation of the tax base differs a lot 
across countries and may not well reflect the benefits, in particular because many countries 
apply outdated values. 
Finally, a widely-discussed alternative would be to shift the tax burden from labour to 
consumption. The choice between taxing consumption or income has been the focus of a large 
amount of theoretical and empirical research. Both types of taxes discourage work by leaving 
leisure untaxed. However, consumption taxes treat current and future consumption in the 
same way while income taxes impose a higher burden on future consumption, discouraging 
savings. The intuition behind this result is that under a consumption tax46, savings can be 
accumulated tax-free. This can increase investment, raise the capital stock, and boost 
                                                 
44  Own calculations based on OECD (2005b). 
45  Another problem is that in some cases these deductions are offered at the highest marginal tax rate of 
individuals, they reduce the progressivity of the tax system. 
46  Consumption taxes have many names: expenditure tax, consumed-income tax, cash-flow tax. In addition, they 
can be applied to both individuals and businesses. The 'Haig-Simons' definition of income is the sum of 
consumption and (positive) changes in wealth. An expenditure tax will mimic consumption by taxing income 
and the decrease in wealth. 
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productivity and the size of the economy47. The tax can be indirect (possibly with 
differentiated tax rates) and applied to commodities, or it could be direct and applied on 
expenditure. In this latter case, the tax base is the income minus the savings. Taxing 
consumption rather than income is also often seen by policy-makers as positive because it 
applies to a larger tax base, which shall allow a lower tax rate and hence reduces distortions. 
Although theoretically the tax base for consumption shall be smaller than the one for income 
(because consumption taxes, unlike income taxes, leave savings untaxed), multiple 
exemptions for taxation of income may make the base larger in practice48. Next, Consumption 
taxes may also allow taxing elements that may be hidden from the income tax declaration. 
Consumption taxes are however not exempt of fraud either. Finally, consumption taxes also 
solve some of the inequities linked with the timing of income collection. Under a classical 
progressive income tax, receiving revenues on one single occasion will push the taxpayer into 
higher marginal tax rates compared to a taxpayer that earns the same amount but over several 
periods. One shall note however that this argument holds only if the consumption tax is 
proportional and the income tax progressive, two conditions that may not hold in practice.  
The main objection against consumption taxes is that they are seen as regressive, 
falling more heavily on those with lower incomes. This can be true if the ratio of consumption 
to income falls with higher incomes and if there is a decreasing marginal utility of revenues. 
One counter-argument however is that consumption taxes can be made progressive. Such a 
system would be similar to those on income taxes in the case of an expenditure tax and 
differentiated tax rates or with a system of allowances in the case of commodity taxation. In 
practice, many countries apply low VAT rates on goods considered as basic needs, although 
the theoretical case for using commodity taxation for redistribution purposes is far from 
obvious in the economic literature (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). Another objection is that 
(commodity) consumption taxes may be less visible because the consumer pays little by little 
over his/her consumption patterns and he/she may also not notice the tax if prices are shown 
tax-included. This lower visibility may increase acceptance.   
In practice, countries do not necessarily face a choice between consumption and 
income taxes as many of them have both. In addition, most consumption taxes and income 
taxes depart from their standard models and are actually hybrid systems. There is widespread 
feeling that countries have increasingly relied on consumption taxes over the last decade, 
although the figures do not necessarily suggest substantial changes49. A dramatic move from 
income to consumption taxes – possibly to finance the welfare state – would carry important 
transition problems, not the least the problem of the retired generation who would then have 
paid high taxes on their income when active and now face high taxes on their consumption 
once retired.  
 
5.  Conclusions. 
 
Over the last few years, we have witnessed a certain stabilisation in the overall tax 
burden. This follows many years of increasing tax burdens in most Member States, reflecting 
increasing public expenditures. More recently, overall levels of expenditure have started to be 
                                                 
47  Internal simulations within the European Commission suggest that the long-run GDP and employment effects 
of a standardised 1% of GDP shift from wage to VAT are both about 0.14% if benefits are exogenous and about 
0.07% if benefits are indexed to consumer prices. 
48  In the EU, the tax base for consumption taxes is approximately a third higher than the tax base for labour (i.e. 
total amount of gross compensation per employee). 
49  The EU-27 GDP-weighted average indirect taxes to total taxes ratio has increased from 33.8% to 35.0% 
between 1995 and 2005. The same ratio for VAT (a sub-category of indirect taxes) moved from 16.8% to 17.5%. 
 25
reduced in an effort to consolidate public finances, followed to some extent by some reduction 
in revenues as a percentage of GDP since the peak in the late 1990s.  
Member States have recently carried out major reforms of their tax systems and these 
reforms have been driven by several interrelated factors. First, the growing awareness that an 
excessive tax burden on labour and its interaction with the benefit systems lowers work 
incentives has led Member States to move towards a more employment-friendly labour 
taxation. Second, Member States have endeavoured to rationalise and simplify their tax 
systems, almost always by broadening the tax base in order to reduce the tax rates. Finally, 
European Member States are facing two main challenges, globalisation and ageing, which 
have raised the issue of how the social models in the European countries should be financed. 
These latter challenges may impact both their need and their capacity to collect taxes. Ageing 
will increase some social spending while reducing the potential of some tax bases such as 
labour. Globalisation has the potential to increase the mobility of capital and of high-skilled 
workers, making it more difficult to rely on them as a source of revenues. The desire to shift 
tax away from labour and to make work pay while retaining the social models will force 
Member States to find alternative robust tax bases. This paper reviews the most recent trends 
in taxation in the European Union and discusses several tax policy issues in the light of the 
main challenges mentioned above. 
The policy goal of pursuing further reductions in labour taxes, given notably the 
pressing need to complete the consolidation of public finance raises difficult political and 
practical issues. Against this background, revenue-neutral tax reforms deserve particular 
attention. This implies that Member States have to look for robust alternative tax bases to 
labour taxation to finance the welfare state. Ideally, new tax bases should be wide – so that a 
low tax rate can be imposed and distortions minimised – and stable – so as to ensure certainty 
in revenue collection. Several options are possible, ranging from an increasing use of 
environmental taxes, a greater reliance on real estate or a shift towards consumption as a tax 
base. All solutions present advantages and disadvantages, as well as practical constraints. This 
may also be why, in practice, shifts have so far been relatively limited. 
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